Sad news about the Dreamliner crash in India today.
www.youtube.com/shorts/GdNIiD3qUzk
Speculation only, but from the above video, it doesn't sound very loud, perhaps a loss of power?
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Looks like the gear was still down and the flaps incorrectly set it seems.
Last edited by: R.P. on Thu 12 Jun 25 at 15:01
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>> Looks like the gear was still down and the flaps incorrectly set it seems.
Early speculation is around a configuration issue was the cause. Also suggestion that the full length of the runway was not used but that seems to be a Flight Radar coverage issue so the backtrack to the end was missing.
It's said there was a mayday call.
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Other options are engine failure - contaminated fuel or birds. Some speculation that a ram air turbine for electrical power if engines out was deployed.
Botton line is it's too early to even speculate but there are already 200+ posts on PPRuNE.
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'it's too early to even speculate'
I'm gonna. Those wings are pancake flat.
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I can confidently say there was not enough lift.
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Astonishingly, one survivor a British man from Leicester.
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That really was bizarre.
See the Indian reporter was already discussing compensation amounts before the plane was due to land in the UK. Did I hear £15.000 per passenger?
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I think the minimum compensation payable is defined by law in India - the following document which dates from 2015 suggests the this would be £8600 - although the amount may have changed since then.
www.civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/migration/Adoption_of_Guidelines_for_Compensation_to_victims09072019171512-3-8.pdf
This is in contrast to UK and most western approaches to compensation which relies upon proof of fault followed by years of litigation in which the principal beneficiaries are the lawyers.
From my time working in India many years ago they can be a very bureaucratic country with a fondness for rules and documentation.
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www.civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/migration/Adoption_of_Guidelines_for_Compensation_to_victims09072019171512-3-8.pdf
>>
>> This is in contrast to UK and most western approaches to compensation which relies upon
>> proof of fault followed by years of litigation in which the principal beneficiaries are the
>> lawyers.
Not really, even in india the passenger relatives will be using the same process after the statutary compo is paid.
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Compensation for death and injury in an aircrash is defined in the Montreal Convention. It is basically an absolute liability unless the claimant was contributory to the accident. I believe India is a signatory to the convention. Payment is defined in SDRs (special drawing rights)
However if the claimant can establish liability for the crash by the airline or the manufacturer he can bring an action in negligence against the airline or manufacturer. This will result in far higher levels of compensation
It is of course much more potentially remunerative to bring an action in the USA rather than India. Boeings product liability insurers could possibly take a big hit on this if Boeing in any way negligent
These claims can drag on for years.
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>> That really was bizarre.
>> See the Indian reporter was already discussing compensation amounts before the plane was due to
>> land in the UK. Did I hear £15.000 per passenger?
Except the man in 11a of course. He will be fined for leaving the aircraft in an unauthorised place
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A 777 pilot explains what he thinks may have happened.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7EZkungFEE&t=602s
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>> A 777 pilot explains what he thinks may have happened.
>>
I have not seen much comment re how much runway was used for the take off.
I have read Pprune with all its repeats and dross.
From what I have read.
Many pilots can detect from experience if an a/c is not accelerating " as normal" during take off.
The 787 has a vast amount of power way beyond normal needs.
The 787 was operating on a route where far less than full tanks of fuel was required.
It was hot outside but not excessive.
It seems that regular operation would use a great deal less runway and the the a/c should climb at a very steep angle.
I suspect the basic cause will soon be found. There is far less data to be searched through.
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How long before airlines start charging a premium for seat 11A?
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Ryanair already are....and they've designated every seat as 11A.
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I did see, some years back a "surviveability" chart, by row. Seem to recall the back was safest.
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>> I did see, some years back a "surviveability" chart, by row. Seem to recall the
>> back was safest.
>>
That's because aircraft rarely reverse in to mountains.
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Final words from the captain, as recorded in the black box: "Thrust not achieved... falling... Mayday! Mayday! Mayday!"
Not surprising, in view of the pictures, angle of the plane etc.
I presume this points to a mechanical failure, not human error - not that I'm any kind of expert.
Last edited by: James Loveless on Sun 15 Jun 25 at 16:20
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Two points to add, from information I read shortly after the incident:
The compensation figure mentioned above was out by a factor of ten. Air India were reported to automatically pay 1 crore rupees per passenger which equates to around £86,000.
In the event of flaps being incorrectly set for take-off etc, a 787-8 would be sounding alarms and giving spoken warnings before the aircraft had left the ground.
It'll all come out eventually I expect.
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Better video apparently shows the RAT was deployed and can be heard so thinking is now leaning towards dual engine failure.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XYO-mj1ugg
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Yeah, dual engine failure, causes? pretty limited, mechanical or fuel issues unlikely for both fail at exactly the same time, bird strike or FOD? hmm possible.
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>> Yeah, dual engine failure, causes? pretty limited, mechanical or fuel issues unlikely for both fail
>> at exactly the same time, bird strike or FOD? hmm possible.
>>
Fuel contamination perhaps?
I hope that second video has not been faked - not by the channel showing it but from some other source IYKWIM - there's so much of it about at the moment.
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>> Fuel contamination perhaps?
Possible, but it tends to be gradual, and not both engines suddenly at the same time, no other aircraft fuelled there from the same source reported issues. As for fuel feed issues, multiple pumps from multiple tanks with multiple crossovers (ie redundancy) in use at near full thrust.
>> I hope that second video has not been faked - not by the channel showing
>> it but from some other source IYKWIM - there's so much of it about at
>> the moment.
No speculation about the RAT came very early, (first 24 hours) with muliple reports of the prop sound.
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787 feeds both engines from the centre tank at take-off.
Even if all fuel pumps lose power, the engines will draw via independent suction feeds, and the filters have bypasses.
Maybe if the tank was significantly contaminated with water? But you couldn't pump a load of water into the tanks without causing other problems (the fuel sensing would go nuts).
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I can confidently say Icing wasnt the problem.
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I think it was all as a result of the guy in 11A hitting his ejector seat button....
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www.flightradar24.com/blog/aviation-explainer-series/seat-11a/
I guess they did a good job on the promotion of the unloved seat
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Does the 787 not have collector tanks?
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I'm not even one tenth qualified to speculate so I won't.
It looks very much as if the engines shut down, dropped to idle, or failed absolutely simultaneously (there is no apparent yaw from asymmetric thrust when the aircraft stops climbing).
The gear was down, but several commentators suggest it had already been commanded 'up' because the bogies were tilted backwards - reportedly the first stage of gear retraction on the 787. So, was hydraulic and or electrical power lost at that point? The apparent loss of thrust happened at around the time that the gear might reasonably be retracted.
Were the failure of the gear retraction, the loss of thrust, and the deployment of the RAT, results of a common cause - such as the failure or shutdown of both engines and the consequent loss of electrical and hydraulic power?
The engines are effectively fly by wire. AIUI they receive all their commands from the FADECS.
The logic in the FADECS I imagine to be incredibly layered and complex. What combination(s) of conditions and/or or commands could have caused both to shut down the engine ( 2 FADECS developing a fault at exactly the same time being very unlikely)? Could the FADECS have been supplied with the same inaccurate data from a single source?
The most obvious unusual thing that day that we have heard about was the high ambient temperature.
Usually there are too many plausible explanations for an accident but in this case even a single plausible explanation seems hard for experts to identify.
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>> Usually there are too many plausible explanations for an accident but in this case even
>> a single plausible explanation seems hard for experts to identify.
Reading on PPRuNE the phrase used is Unicorn event - like the BA triple seven that just made it to the grass before the runway at LHR with iced up fuel filters.
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I'm sure I heard or read that this particular aircraft had a record of electrical and hydraulic power failures but I can find no references to this now.
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How the Air India crash investigation is unfolding
www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4gkd555jlko
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SWMBO tells me there are multiple reports in the popular press and on social media that Mr. 11A was never on the plane...
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Best not to spread unsubstantiated rumours. If someone has proof of their allegation they should show it.
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Let the conspiracy theories begin!
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"Let the conspiracy theories begin!"
OK - here we go. The red-tops are at it; here's the Evening Standard: "Air India investigators probing whether deadly crash that killed 260 was 'sabotage'".
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A preliminary report by Indian aviation accident investigators this evening stated that fuel to the engines was unexpectedly cut off moments before the crash.
"In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cut off. The other pilot responded that he did not do so," the report says.
I don't know enough about aviation technology to be able to say whether this means a technical malfunction was behind the crash, not human error.
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The fuel was deliberately switched off. There is no conceivable reason why this would be done other than as a deliberate act to kill yourself and others on board. What was the motive we may never know.
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I think it's still conjecture at this stage.
According to the Telegraph here:
www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2025/07/11/pilot-error-air-india-crash-investigation/
Startling cockpit exchange: Voice recordings captured one pilot urgently asking, “Why did you cut off?”—met with a stunned reply, “I didn’t.”
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>> The fuel was deliberately switched off. There is no conceivable reason why this would be
>> done other than as a deliberate act to kill yourself and others on board. What
>> was the motive we may never know.
Not saying you're definitely wrong but there are other possible explanations.
People sometimes do apparently inexplicable things where things like 'muscle memory' go askew or actions are prompted by false cues.
There are any number of engine failure incidents where the wrong engine has been shut down; the Midland 737 at East Midlands was the stand out UK example.
Much more recently a BA 777 was involved in an incident where the first officer was Pilot Flying and instead of removing his left hand from the power levers retarded them.
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/681b144c386c17c856f17359/Boeing_777-236_G-VIIT_05-25.pdf
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Link to the Indian AAIB report and plenty of commentary, I suspect not all of it informed, here:
www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/667141-preliminary-air-india-crash-report-published.htm
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“There are any number of engine failure incidents where the wrong engine has been shut down”
This is not a case of the wrong engine being shut down. There was no reason to shut down either engine. Both engines were deliberately shut down. That is not something that can be done accidentally. There could only be one consequence of that action. The aircraft would crash.
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>> “There are any number of engine failure incidents where the wrong engine has been shut
>> down”
>>
>> This is not a case of the wrong engine being shut down. There was no
>> reason to shut down either engine. Both engines were deliberately shut down. That is not
>> something that can be done accidentally. There could only be one consequence of that action.
>> The aircraft would crash.
It absolutely can be done accidentally. There was crash in Nepal where the pilot feathered the propellers on a regional turboprop when intending to operate flaps and/or undercarriage. The crash of Trident PI in 1972 was the result of selecting 'droops' up rather than flaps. That's perhaps a more understandable issue but several pilots had done similar before.
One possibility here.
There was an issue on the aircraft's previous flight affecting the stabiliser trim. The switches for that are right next to the fuel cut off switches, just needs a brain fart to operate the wrong one.
The PPRuNE thread linked above discusses the possibility in detail and with apparent examples from people of done similar in the front seat of an airliner.
You're also off beam in saying that once the switches were operated a crash was inevitable. The interim report is quite clear that they were flipped back to 'run' within ten seconds. Following that one engine was spooling up after a restart and the other was having a couple of hiccups as the system had it restarting. A few seconds more and it would have been aviations biggest 'near miss' in decades.
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Listening to an ex-pilot on the radio this morning, he referenced a historic warning re: (these) switches, and questioned whether or not Air India had carried out the recommended checks.
Certainly only conjecture, but given the circumstances it is quite intriguing.
The bulletin concerning the switches is here:
ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/NM-18-33.pdf/SIB_NM-18-33_1
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>> The fuel was deliberately switched off. There is no conceivable reason why this would be
>> done other than as a deliberate act to kill yourself and others on board. What
>> was the motive we may never know.
Absolutely not the only concievable reason.
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As Bromps link gives page not found, here's a link directly to the report (just in case interested people haven'/t already found it!)
aaib.gov.in/What%27s%20New%20Assets/Preliminary%20Report%20VT-ANB.pdf
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>> As Bromps link gives page not found, here's a link directly to the report (just
>> in case interested people haven'/t already found it!)
I'll try again with the PPRune link but perhaps one needs to be logged in to see it.
www.pprune.org/accidents-close-calls/667141-preliminary-air-india-crash-report-published.html
EDIT: seems to go to the page now.
Last edited by: Bromptonaut on Sat 12 Jul 25 at 08:55
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Apparently the fuel cut off switches are difficult to operate accidently as there is some sort of "gate" that the switches need to be lifted over to operate.
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Indeed, but see the bulletin I posted above...
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I could conceive of one switch moving accidentally, but not both and not within a second of each other.
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That there was anything wrong with the plain has been discounted. The investigation is inevitably now focused on the mental health of the pilot.
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>> That there was anything wrong with the plain has been discounted. The investigation is inevitably
>> now focused on the mental health of the pilot.
No. It's focussed on how the fuel cut off valves were moved to closed.
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No . We know the fuel valves were switched to off by one of the pilots. We know this cannot be done by accident. The only question is why. It is difficult to accept that a pilot would do this and we don’t want to believe it but it is the only logical answer.
I strongly suspect the final report will reveal a history of stress and mental instability in one of the pilots.
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>> No . We know the fuel valves were switched to off by one of the
>> pilots. We know this cannot be done by accident.
Can you explain why closing the valves cannot be done by accident?
For example mixing them by mistaking with some other switch....
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Can you explain why closing the valves cannot be done by accident?
The words of an expert
"So, let's say we are going to cut-off to run. It's a spring-loades switch, you have to grasp it, pull it out, pull it up and release it over the detent. That's how it goes to the run position and it stays there for the duration of the flight, unless ofcourse there is a dual engine failure and you need to bring it to the cut off position. But taking it to run to cut off is also the same three step procedure. You have to grasp it, pull it back over the detent, pull it down and release it because it is spring-loaded to the cut-off position."
It is not conceivable that was done by accident or confused with another procedure. The switches were turned off deliberately.
Sometime it is difficult to accept the only possible answer because of its implications
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>> It's a spring-loades switch, you have to grasp it, pull it out, pull it up and release it over the detent.
A good video of the switches here:
www.youtube.com/shorts/N2-JjvVJrCA
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>> It is not conceivable that was done by accident or confused with another procedure. The
>> switches were turned off deliberately.
>>
>> Sometime it is difficult to accept the only possible answer because of its implications
>>
>>
>>
>>
It's perfectly conceivable, the quote you use over eggs the pudding on how hard it is to operate them. A three stage process, yes if you are pedantic about it, its a second at most to operate them. People can and do make strange mistakes. It's happened before and it'll happen again.
I've no idea of the actual causes, it may well be some sort of suicide. I wouldn't be so quick to rule out an error in procedure.
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>> I've no idea of the actual causes, it may well be some sort of suicide.
>> I wouldn't be so quick to rule out an error in procedure.
That's pretty much the summary of where we are now.
Suicide cannot be ruled out but if you're at the pointy end of a Dreamliner and are determined to use that as a tool to kill yourself there are more obvious ways than pulling the fuel shut offs immediately after rotation.
Confusing controls, or just plain mixing them up, has caused any number of accidents and incidents. Fursty mentions flap/undercarriage. Undercarriages have been retracted on the ground. I linked a report upthread where a BA pilot pulled back (ie retarded) the throttles rather than moving their hand to the yoke and pulling that back.
We'll have to wait for the full report.
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We'll have to wait for the full report.
Indeed. Pretty obvious what it’s going to say though.
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>> We'll have to wait for the full report.
>>
>> Indeed. Pretty obvious what it’s going to say though.
>>
You seem pretty keen on that conclusion, any reason why?
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I have no real opinion but did think if it was suicide maybe doing it later into the flight would have meant the outcome would have been more certain. And also, though not necessarily, have shown more concern for people of the ground.
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>> I could conceive of one switch moving accidentally, but not both and not within a
>> second of each other.
But could they be moved by accident; operated instead of some other controal?
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I would imagine that muscle memory relating to the operation oft the fuel cut offs in an experienced pilot would immediately alert them to the fact they were doing the wrong thing providing whatever else they were supposed to be doing did not have a similar action. I believe the fuel cut off switches are a 2 stage action.
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>> I would imagine that muscle memory relating to the operation oft the fuel cut offs
>> in an experienced pilot would immediately alert them to the fact they were doing the
>> wrong thing providing whatever else they were supposed to be doing did not have a
>> similar action. I believe the fuel cut off switches are a 2 stage action.
>>
Mistakes like that do happen, but I've never heard of it in relation to fuel control switches before. Having said that selecting the flaps up instead of the gear is still a relatively common error, and they're in different places with totally different levers.
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Surely all this discussion on the switches being 'moved' has missed several vital points.
The switches are merely an electrical contact device, how is it monitored ie does the monitoring come from a sensor (in its broadest sense) actually on the fuel feed at the tank, or at the engine? How is the 'position' (ie status) displayed to the pilots? is it only through the physical position of the switch or is there an additional warning (feedback) warning indicator, which would seem to be sensible for such a major function? Does the contactor function merely as a an on/off or does it drive on/off and off/on?
As a passenger I would like to think it it is something better than an on /off device!
My understanding is that information released so far is based only on the CVR or have they actually recovered the data?
And let us not lose site of the fact that 'pilot error' is a very convenient tag for all manufacturers.
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It seems, based on what's reported elsewhere, that it's a toggle switch but one that needs to be pulled and raised over a detent to move from run to cut or vice versa. The detent guards against the switch being moved accidentally, for example if caught by shirt cuff, as well as making its operation a deliberate act.
The first officer was the pilot flying so, at the time of the switches being operated expectation would be that he'd have both hands on the control yoke.
There are switches next to the fuel cut off for the trim which had been logged as defective on the previous flight..
Is it possible the captain intended to do something with those and operated the fuel cut offs instead?
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is there an additional warning (feedback) warning indicator,
Yes those big noisy jets suddenly go quiet.
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>> is there an additional warning (feedback) warning indicator,
>>
>> Yes those big noisy jets suddenly go quiet.
But they take quite a long time to become noisy again
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I believe the switches have at least 4 discrete outputs. The engine would not shut down on any single one. Not sure if each channel is one bit or two bits, but there is no way both switches would fail simultaneously.
>> There are switches next to the fuel cut off for the trim which had been logged as
>> defective on the previous flight..
Is that in the report? Those switches (alternate pitch trim) aren't used in day-to-day flying but may occasionally be used to set the stabiliser position for take-off.
Last edited by: Fursty Ferret on Tue 15 Jul 25 at 15:21
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Section 12 on page 13, second para says:
The crew of the previous flight (AI423) had made Pilot Defect Report (PDR) entry for status
message “STAB POS XDCR” in the Tech Log.
I've not got your understanding of the detail of how the 787's systems work in that regard and may well be doing a 2+2=5 thing. No more than observation of the proximity of Stab controls to the engine cut off switches.
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I've looked at the STAB POS XDCR status message in the MEL and it has no relevance to this situation. It just relates to one of the three transducers which transmit stabiliser position to the various flight control computers.
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>> Mistakes like that do happen, but I've never heard of it in relation to fuel
>> control switches before. Having said that selecting the flaps up instead of the gear is
>> still a relatively common error, and they're in different places with totally different levers.
Exactly. It's possible to do something deliberately, but accidentally be doing the wrong thing.
I know someone (quite well) who once went upstairs to change his shirt and when he got there took his trousers off. An action subject to a detent mechanism namely unbuckling of belt and undoing of button.
Last edited by: Manatee on Wed 16 Jul 25 at 15:18
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>> I know someone (quite well) who once went upstairs to change his shirt and when
>> he got there took his trousers off.
But were they a passenger carrying airline pilot?
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“Exactly. It's possible to do something deliberately, but accidentally be doing the wrong thing.“
An argument that could surely be used to excuse any illegal action.”
Seriously do you really believe that an experienced pilot at a most critical stage of the flight when his concentration would be greatest would actually turn off both engines of the plane uaircraft without being aware of what he had done?
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>> Seriously do you really believe that an experienced pilot at a most critical stage of
>> the flight when his concentration would be greatest would actually turn off both engines of
>> the aircraft without being aware of what he had done?
Yes I do.
How many examples of similar 'brain fart' actions do you need quoted?
I've linked to the report of a BA pilot who moved the throttles back instead of moving his left hand to the control column and pulling that back. Fursty, who knows this stuff, says flap/landing gear confusion is far more common than you'd think.
Most times it's no more than a reportable incident but every now and then - Staines 1972 confusion between high lift devices at the leading and trailing edges of the wing - it's a real crash with all perishing.
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>> Seriously do you really believe that an experienced pilot at a most critical stage of
>> the flight when his concentration would be greatest would actually turn off both engines of
>> the plane uaircraft without being aware of what he had done?
Air accident investigations are littered with pilots doing all sorts of inexplicable things in every stage of flight. At take off the cockpit workload is very high
Last edited by: Zero on Wed 16 Jul 25 at 16:40
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I believe it could happen, yes. I'm not saying it's probable. It's extremely unlikely.
What do you think the odds are? 350 million to 1?
That would be one every 10 years on average. There are a lot of flights.
It's about distraction, which happens when people are doing familiar things which, however important, don't need much thought.
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What do you think the odds are of the pilot intentionally turning off the fuel switches? More or less?
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The shirt/trouser analogy above is entirely spurious.
As normal folk age some become prone to inexplicable behaviours - short term memory loss, slow reactions, poor judgement, impaired hearing and vision, through to full blown Alzheimer's.
Plots tend to be young, medically fit, mental health routinely assessed, operating in an industry which places a very high priority on safety.
It is not impossible that the failure was the result of a brain fart, but IMHO very unlikely.
More likely is deliberate switch off knowing the consequences by one of the two up front.
Failure due to design, manufacturing or maintenance deficiencies are also plausible. Boeing would no doubt prefer this is not the case as it could be commercially very damaging - they have enough recent experience of planes being grounded due to design flaws.
Not suggesting a cover up - but wait for the final report before coming to a conclusion.
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>> The shirt/trouser analogy above is entirely spurious.
>>
>> As normal folk age some become prone to inexplicable behaviours - short term memory loss,
>> slow reactions, poor judgement, impaired hearing and vision, through to full blown Alzheimer's.
>>
>> Plots tend to be young, medically fit, mental health routinely assessed, operating in an industry
>> which places a very high priority on safety.
I'll allow a bit, but not entirely, spurious. Pilots are not supermen.
The captain was 56, and about to retire. People age differently. Younger people also have brain farts.
All the possible explanations here would be extremely unlikely events.
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>> What do you think the odds are of the pilot intentionally turning off the fuel
>> switches? More or less?
>>
It's more common for aircrew to flick the wrong switch than a mass murder/suicide in an aircraft.
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>> What do you think the odds are of the pilot intentionally turning off the fuel
>> switches? More or less?
Have you actually read, or thought about, various links/references upthread to pilots doing pretty much EXACTLY the sort of thing that happened here?
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>> What do you think the odds are of the pilot intentionally turning off the fuel
>> switches
You mean at the wrong time like this?
About as likely or unlikely as doing so accidentally as I described, based on the incidences of suicide by airliner.
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Did a quick bit of Ai research
In commercial airline accidents last 20 years, 50-60% of causes are pilot error. 0.3% are aircrew suicide
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Our speculations, if that's what they are, would be of slightly less negligible value if we had the CVR transcript.
They have only released the bit where the FO (IIRC) asks why the captain turned off the fuel switches and the captain says he didn't.
The FO/co-pilot was pilot flying (PF), the captain was pilot monitoring (PM).
The PM should call the 80kt. cross check, then "V1" at the decision speed (could be an auto call from the aircraft) then at Vr "rotate". Shortly after he should call "positive rate (of climb)" The PF calls for "gear up" which the PM does and then confirms "gear up".
Which of these calls was made, and when, in relation to the operation of the fuel switches?
In my imagination, the captain is reminded by the take off situation that he is about to retire. His next physical task will be to raise the gear. He absent-mindedly puts his fingers on the fuel cut offs (this is a stretch but we are considering a 1 in one billion error here). He calls "positive rate" the PF says "gear up" and, forgetting his fingers are resting on the fuel switches and muscle memory taking over, the captain shuts off the fuel. (another big stretch).
OTOH if it is discovered that one of them had recent serious mood problems, other possibilities become less unlikely.
It's horrible to think about pilot error, let alone suicide, when they are not around to defend themselves but I think the investigators .just know they are steering expectations towards pilot error.
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70-80% of crashes are attributed to pilot error.
Whether this s simply a default conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary is debateable - damage to bits of the plane must make it difficult to conclusively identify component failure.
It is also far more attractive for the manufacturer that the pilot is blamed for an accident than the alternative which may be to ground £BNs of planes and consequent reputational damage.
I do not suggest they will act with a blatant lack of integrity - but it is a "convenient" outcome.
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Yes and Boeing IIRC tried to construe pilot error after the first MCAS crash.
My belief however, having read a few, is that air accident investigations themselves are generally pretty rigorous and well conducted. Hopefully they will have a clear CVR recording which will further illuminate this one.
The direct cause, on the face of it, was the inappropriate operation of the fuel cut-off switches.
It could be quite a while before the full investigation report is published.
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I'm surprised they don't have CCTV in the cockpit, transmitted back to base with the privacy safeguard that it can only be accessed after an incident and is wiped when the plane lands safely.
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watch this
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVS76zcpZok
Last edited by: Zero on Thu 17 Jul 25 at 20:24
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Jeez.......(I watched it, especially at 16mins onwards).....I cannot believe these cut-off switches are so easy to operate and in such a convenient location. Apparently there is not even an audiovisual 'did you really mean to do this' or 'FUEL IS CUT OFF' warning, as on a basic computer when you e.g. 'delete' rather than 'forward' email. Who has not absent mindedly selected the wrong knob or stalk, e.g. wipers instead of indicators, or a forward gear instead of reverse?
Although suicide a la Air Berlin is a possibility, it seems to me blindingly obvious that this was what is somewhat vulgarly but aptly described as a 'brain fart'. No doubt thousands of hours and squillions of dollars will be expended during an absurdly long lawyer driven 'inquiry' to argue about this.
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There is a really big "FUEL IS CUT OFF WARNING", it's the engine stopping. You can't add a "Are you sure?" aspect as the switches are hard-wired to the engines and LP fuel valves. I would support the introduction of a mechanical lock that prevents the fuel control switches from moving if the thrust levers aren't at idle, but to be honest it's still overkill.
Very little information is available and I would strongly encourage the average person who has no idea what happens on a day-to-day basis in an aircraft flight deck to avoid speculation.
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Can't argue with that FF.
Wouldn't there be resistance to almost any form of interlock? The fuel cut off in an emergency situation has the vital function of stopping the fuel flow immediately. Any sort of interlock, software or hardware, potentially introduces another point of failure/fault that could prevent it working.
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I realise operation of the fuel cut off in flight would have an absolutely catastrophic outcome but surely there is a large number of similar switches which are almost equally as dangerous, and it wouldn't be practical (maybe desirable in some) for them all to have "two factor authentication" for want of a better term...
Especially given it hasn't featured in many crash reports, has it?
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(We all try to imagine driving our cars with 2 factor authentication).
If you need the emergency cut off, you need it there and then. Unlikely and ridiculous as it seems, about 40 years ago I had a vaguely analogous situation in a car.
It was an XJ6 4.2 automatic. Setting off at a roundabout, I stomped on the accelerator which stuck down at full throttle. Couldn't dip the clutch because there wasn't one, can't remember whether I tried to brake immediately or not...I turned off the ignition, Luckily the key was in the same place (RHS of steering column) as on my then everyday Golf. I wonder if modern drive-by-wire ignition/start button would have worked the same way?
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(Oops I initially speed-read it that you were suggesting adding 2FA not the opposite)
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>> stomped on the accelerator which stuck down at full throttle.
That happened to me about 40 years ago too. I was showing orf to a cousin in my Dolomite Sprint automatic!
I must admit I did panic as it was a fairly powerful car in those days. I also ended up switching off the ignition.
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>> >> stomped on the accelerator which stuck down at full throttle.
>>
>> That happened to me about 40 years ago too. I was showing orf to a
>> cousin in my Dolomite Sprint automatic!
>>
>> I must admit I did panic as it was a fairly powerful car in those
>> days. I also ended up switching off the ignition.
Accelerators are made to be stomped on - pressed to the full extent of their travel to get maximum acceleration.
That it stayed stomped evidences mechanical failure probably through poor component design or lack of lubrication. It is not driver error nor analogous to the unintended operation of fuel cut off switches.
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>> That it stayed stomped evidences mechanical failure probably through poor component design or lack of
>> lubrication. It is not driver error nor analogous to the unintended operation of fuel cut
>> off switches.
It was a conversational anecdote not a learned paper.
Howsomever, the analogy was between using the fuel cut off switch in an emergency vs. turning off the ignition to avoiding firing off the roundabout at a tangent. And then pondering on whether pressing the START/STOP button of a modern car, which sends a "button pressed" value to a microprocessor, would in fact have stopped the engine when it was at 4000rpm, in gear, and with the accelerator at maximum. I might try that on my way to the paper shop tomorrow.
If you have a switch hard wired to the actual fuel shut off valve you have a pretty good idea of what will happen when you operate it. If you let a microprocessor decide, based on thrust lever position, weight on wheels, thrust set, or whatever, you won't be quite so certain.
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>> If you have a switch hard wired to the actual fuel shut off valve you
>> have a pretty good idea of what will happen when you operate it. If you
>> let a microprocessor decide, based on thrust lever position, weight on wheels, thrust set, or
>> whatever, you won't be quite so certain.
Indeed, the assumption is you could need to shut off fuel to an engine for a reason in a number of situations from as mundane as parked at gate at flight end, to a number of more in a hurry emergency situations in any phase of flight or circumstance so there is no logical interlocks or dependencies. As the Captain proved.
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>> I wonder if modern drive-by-wire ignition/start button would have worked the same way?
>>
Nope. The ECU receives a signal from the brake pedal switch and will cut or severely limit fuel to the engine.
The brake pedal switch is considered so important it's a two-bit output, so in the event of a fault it'll go into an implausible condition as opposed to transmitting the wrong position (ESP etc behaves very differently if a brake pedal input is sensed).
Although fuel control switches have a gate to prevent inadvertent movement, they aren't guarded switches because if you move the wrong one, you can put it back and the engine will relight and recover thrust within a few seconds. Since you shouldn't be touching them at low level (all procedures require that the aircraft is above 400ft, autopilot in, and a considered diagnosis takes place between both pilots), this isn't a big deal.
The guarded switches elsewhere are covered solely because they control irreversible actions.
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>> >> I wonder if modern drive-by-wire ignition/start button would have worked the same way?
>> >>
>>
>> Nope. The ECU receives a signal from the brake pedal switch and will cut or
>> severely limit fuel to the engine.
>>
>> The brake pedal switch is considered so important it's a two-bit output, so in the
>> event of a fault it'll go into an implausible condition as opposed to transmitting the
>> wrong position (ESP etc behaves very differently if a brake pedal input is sensed).
I've had a couple of cars that did that, although neither had a START-STOP button
Neither my Mitsubishi nor my MX-5 cut the fuel (noticeably) if I left foot brake to dry the brakes while maintaining speed with the accelerator. Perhaps they would if I emergency-braked. The Mitsubishi is automatic. The MX-5 doesn't prevent me heeling and toeing either. Both have buttons rather than ignition keys.
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>> There is a really big "FUEL IS CUT OFF WARNING", it's the engine stopping. You
>> can't add a "Are you sure?" aspect as the switches are hard-wired to the engines
>> and LP fuel valves. I would support the introduction of a mechanical lock that prevents
>> the fuel control switches from moving if the thrust levers aren't at idle, but to
>> be honest it's still overkill.
As I've seen from various accounts having the fuel cut offs where they are is a Boeing philosophy going back at least as far as the 737 and possibly before. Where are they on an Airbus?
Accounts on PPRune suggest Embraer have them protected and on the over head panel. Might there also be incidents where and engine 'runs away' and where getting it to idle before cutting off fuel creates its own problems?
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Accounts on PPRune suggest Embraer have them protected and on the over head panel. Might
>> there also be incidents where and engine 'runs away' and where getting it to idle
>> before cutting off fuel creates its own problems?
>>
Engine runaways are very rare indeed. There's several safety devices that stop it from a full blown runaway. You can stop the fuel demand on the throttles. They are connected to and control the hp c0ck in the main engine fuel pump. The fuel cut offs normally switch off the supply side from the collector tanks.
There are problems with shutting off the supply side fuel pumps, it can cause cavitation and damage components but the time difference would have to be quite a while and if you're in an emergency and it's all done quickly it won't really matter.
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>> Accounts on PPRune suggest Embraer have them protected and on the over head panel. Might
>> >> there also be incidents where and engine 'runs away' and where getting it to
>> idle
>> >> before cutting off fuel creates its own problems?
>> >>
>>
>> Engine runaways are very rare indeed. There's several safety devices that stop it from a
>> full blown runaway. You can stop the fuel demand on the throttles. They are connected
>> to and control the hp c0ck in the main engine fuel pump. The fuel cut
>> offs normally switch off the supply side from the collector tanks.
>> There are problems with shutting off the supply side fuel pumps, it can cause cavitation
>> and damage components but the time difference would have to be quite a while and
>> if you're in an emergency and it's all done quickly it won't really matter.
>>
The thrust levers have no mechanical connection to the engines on any modern aircraft.
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The thrust levers have no mechanical connection to the engines on any modern aircraft.
Correct. I didn't say they still were though. They were replaced by wiring starting in the 1980s.
Last edited by: sooty123 on Sat 26 Jul 25 at 09:30
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I'm sure I saw a report (that now appears to have been 'pulled') blaming the pilots for shutting down the wrong engine. I can no longer find it.
It said one engine suffered a bird strike, as evidenced by blood and feathers inside the engine, but the pilots shut down the other engine! However, it also said blood and feathers were found in both engines!
It also said the proper procedure in the case of a bird strike was to do a 'go around'. Difficult I should imagine if both engines were 'ducked up'.
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>> I'm sure I saw a report (that now appears to have been 'pulled') blaming the
>> pilots for shutting down the wrong engine. I can no longer find it.
>> It said one engine suffered a bird strike, as evidenced by blood and feathers inside
>> the engine, but the pilots shut down the other engine! However, it also said blood
>> and feathers were found in both engines!
There's a lot on nonsense and fake news over this accident.
The official interim report is clear that birds or other foreign object damage were not a factor.
I'm not sure what the proper process is with a bird strike on final approach. The memorable recentish incident of that nature was a Ryanair 737-800 and Milan. Both engines lost and effectively a crash landing with the airframe written off. Everybody survived.
On take off once past the go/no go decision speed, V1, the problem will be taken into the air to be diagnosed and sorted. Obviously if both engines are totally out that's not happening but modern engines are made of tough stuff and miracle in the Hudson type accidents are vanishingly rare.
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Air India Boeing - R.P.
